Global Voices - category 'freedom of speech'

Despite clear calls for coordinated attacks, Meta did not act to safeguard these activist pages

Originally published on Global Voices

Photo by Bastian Riccardi from Pexels. Used under a Pexels License.

For the past several months, a coordinated digital campaign has targeted community archivists in Bangladesh who document and preserve audiovisual material related to the July 2024 Student-People’s Mass Uprising, including its history, collective memory, and records of human rights violations.

These attacks systematically exploit weaknesses in Meta’s copyright enforcement mechanisms, with the primary objective of removing Facebook pages that host critical documentation of the movement. Despite repeated appeals to Meta by affected community archivists, the responses have been limited and largely ineffective.

We spoke with at least three young documentarians through messaging platforms and phone calls. They confirmed that their Facebook pages functioned as informal but highly significant digital archives of this historical moment. A substantial portion of this content is already being used as evidentiary material in proceedings at the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal addressing mass violence linked to the July 2024 uprising.

Read more: Concerted attacks against Bangladeshi activists on Facebook

When copyright strikes are submitted using fake email identities and fabricated claims, Meta removes videos and images without adequate verification or due process. For many self-organized archivist communities, Facebook has served as their primary platform for public engagement and memory preservation. As a result of Meta’s failure to ensure adequate safeguards, critical documentation is being lost, directly affecting broader transitional justice processes.

A vital platform, with coordinated abuse

Saleh Mahmud Rayhan, a student involved in the July 2024 uprising, later co-founded the July Revolutionary Alliance (JRA) with a group of his contemporaries. In an interview conducted with Global Voices via Zoom, Rayhan stated that the organization’s mandate includes collecting, preserving, and disseminating videos documenting human rights violations, using Facebook as its primary platform to reach the public.

For many young, self-organized communities in Bangladesh — often operating without formal training, technical capacity, or institutional funding — Facebook has become the default infrastructure for documentation and outreach. As the most widely used platform among Bangladeshi internet users, it serves not only as a publishing tool but also as a space to amplify victims’ voices and share evidence.

In JRA’s case, these materials have contributed to broader accountability efforts, including ongoing proceedings at the International Crimes Tribunal examining allegations of crimes against humanity, including murder and enforced disappearance, linked to the July 2024 student-led protests.

On February 15, 2026, Meta suspended JRA’s main Facebook page, which had approximately 547,000 followers, citing multiple copyright violations. However, the materials shared on the page were user-generated and distributed for non-commercial, public-interest purposes. While JRA does not claim ownership of all content, closer scrutiny suggests that those submitting the copyright complaints were not the rightful owners either.

On 22 March, JRA’s backup page, “July Revolutionary Alliance, South Region,” was also suspended on similar grounds. Although the page was later restored after multiple appeals, it remains at risk due to ongoing false claims.

Facebook removed content based on a third-party copyright claim, submitted via “shakhawathossain1986@outlook.com” on behalf of “H M Murad,” concerning a viral photograph of a politician, despite the email address not belonging to him, which concerned a photograph that had also been publicly shared by the politician's party.

A similar pattern affected The Red July, another self-organized community archivist group formed by survivors of the July 2024 uprising that works to document violations and amplify affected voices. The group lost two of its Facebook pages under comparable circumstances.

Sajib Hossain, an administrator of The Red July, stated during a phone call and later provided supporting documentation via WhatsApp messages that the group’s two primary pages — one with approximately 300,000 followers and the other with 125,000, named “The Red July Production”—simultaneously received between eight and ten copyright strikes. As a result, the pages were suspended almost immediately, leaving administrators with insufficient time to respond or implement protective measures.

Meta removed a post by The Red July, a photo of Bhutan's PM in Bangladesh, due to a false copyright claim filed by Slang name id using the derogatory email “julycdi7890@gmail.com.”

Findings from the investigation indicate that these claims do not appear to constitute legitimate copyright disputes. Instead, individuals are seemingly creating fake email accounts and submitting third-party complaints. Meta appears to accept these claims without sufficient verification, resulting in the removal of content, including materials originally published by the communities themselves. Automated appeal mechanisms have so far provided limited effective remedies.

Meta’s failure to safeguard the affected pages

Both organizations report a consistent pattern of targeted harassment. They describe receiving explicit threats from cyber groups aligned with political actors connected to ongoing trials for crimes against humanity. These threats often demand the removal of posts related to political figures, including former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

A Facebook page named “Network-71” publicly declared its intention to remove content from The Red July. Similarly, accounts using the names “Mahir Chowdhury” and “Nadim Chowdhury” issued public threats to take down posts related to the July 2024 uprising.

Shortly after such warnings, waves of false copyright claims are reportedly submitted from anonymous or unverified email accounts targeting the same content. In several cases, individuals publicly announce intended takedowns, issue threats, and later share screenshots celebrating successful removals. See here and here.

Network 71 publicly admitted to falsely reporting the post that led Facebook to remove activist Facebook groups.

These posts, often accompanied by celebratory or abusive language, suggest deliberate and coordinated misuse of platform reporting systems. Despite these clear indicators, including prior threats and synchronized reporting, Meta has not taken effective action to identify or prevent this pattern of abuse.

Saleh Mahmud Rayhan described how one account sent direct messages warning that specific posts had to be removed or the entire page would be taken down. Within two days, around seven posts were targeted with false claims. Meta accepted the claims, removed the posts, and subsequently suspended the page.

JRA representatives later contacted individuals whose names had been used in the complaints. Those individuals confirmed that they had not submitted any copyright claims, indicating that their identities may have been misused through fabricated email accounts. Rayhan emphasized that these removals resulted in the loss of critical visual evidence documenting human rights violations during the uprising.

This image, sourced from JRA, illustrates the progression of threats. Initially, there were private demands to remove a post critical of their party; when this was refused, they proceeded to submit a fraudulent copyright claim.

A recurring tactic of digital repression in Bangladesh

The use of copyright claims to suppress political opponents is not new in Bangladesh. Rather, it appears to have become a recurring method used to restrict critical voices online.

In 2022, independent news site Netra News reported that groups linked to the then-Awami League-led government were involved in hacking critics’ Facebook accounts. Around the same period, separate reporting documented how a hacker group took down Amar Desh Online, a media outlet critical of the government, through the use of false copyright claims.

Read more: Bangladesh: Meta accuses ruling party and think tank of coordinated inauthentic behavior

Recent incidents suggest that similar tactics are now being used more broadly: not only against political opponents, but also against human rights groups, investigative journalists, and fact-checking initiatives.

One example involves The Dissent, a Bangladesh-based investigative and fact-checking platform that has been targeted by fake copyright claims. The publication’s editor, Qadaruddin Shishir, stated in an interview that several of their reports, including fact-checks of AI-generated images, were removed from Facebook after being flagged for alleged copyright violations. Despite the content being originally produced by their own reporters, Shishir noted that these complaints originated from unverifiable email addresses but were nonetheless accepted by Meta Platforms, Inc. without meaningful scrutiny.

These fraudulent tactics have affected a broad spectrum of voices, with activists and journalists among the primary targets. The reach of these claims has extended to the former interim government’s official advisory pages, the social media accounts of the Head of Government, and memorial tributes to slain activist Osman Hadi. The system’s lack of scrutiny was further highlighted when original materials, including a journalist’s own photography, were erroneously flagged as infringing and removed from the platform.

In several cases, coordinated groups have openly claimed responsibility for these takedowns. Groups identifying themselves as “Crack Platoon, Bangladesh Cyber Force,” “Dark Cyber Gang,” and “Qawmi Cyber Expert Team” have publicly stated that they use copyright reporting tools to remove pages and accounts, and have shared evidence of these actions online.

Platform failure and an accountability gap

These incidents point to significant weaknesses in Meta’s copyright enforcement processes. The lack of effective verification appears to allow coordinated actors to misuse reporting systems to target activists, archivists, and journalists.

This issue extends beyond routine content moderation concerns. The removal of such content affects the ability to document events, share information, and preserve records that may be relevant to accountability processes.

Without stronger safeguards — including improved verification, greater transparency in decision-making, and accessible appeal mechanisms — these practices are likely to continue, with broader implications for digital rights and public-interest documentation in Bangladesh.

Jobair Ahmad Co-authored this report. Written by Shoeb A

How civil society is responding to the tech-infused authoritarian context

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Ameya Nagarajan on Canva Pro for Global Voices

By Brett Davidson

This post is part of Global Voices’ April 2026 Spotlight series, “Human perspectives on AI.” This series will offer insight into how AI is being used in global majority countries, how its use and implementation are affecting individual communities, what this AI experiment might mean for future generations, and more. You can support this coverage by donating here.

Technology such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and algorithm-driven platforms is having unprecedented impacts on almost every aspect of life, from academia to employment to the environment. When it comes to social justice, democracy and human rights, things look bleak: algorithms are channeling us into ideological echo-chambers, while AI has taken surveillance and data extraction to alarming new levels. At the same time, social media platforms enable civil society organizations to reach audiences and tell stories in powerful new ways, while AI allows people to do research and message testing they would never otherwise be able to afford.

As part of a recent project called “New Tech, New Rules,” the International Resource for Impact and Storytelling (IRIS), with support from Luminate and the Open Society Foundations, commissioned 10 case studies from organizations and researchers across the Global Majority, to hear how this new technology is affecting them and their work, and how they are adapting and adjusting. The studies came from across Latin America and the Caribbean, the Arab region, Nigeria, Tunisia, India and Hong Kong.

Each case study is incredibly rich and interesting in itself (and some of their authors are writing about them for Global Voices) — but, looking across them, we were able to discern several interesting patterns that perhaps resonate and offer lessons for others.

A toolkit of tactics: Co-opting, countering and innovating

Across the case studies, we saw three clear ways in which civil society is responding to the tech-infused authoritarian context: through Co-opting, Countering and Innovating.

Some organizations are co-opting culture and technology for their own purposes: for example, Fogo Cruzado in Brazil is collaborating with the UK-based Future Narratives Lab to use AI to test messages aimed at reducing public support for police violence in favelas.

Others are focused on countering and resisting tech-driven surveillance and digital violence, such as Derechos Digitales, which is using social media to campaign and mobilise opposition against the widespread use of facial recognition technologies by authorities in Brazil and Chile.

Still others are innovating, finding new forms and approaches to journalism and to narrative civic engagement. An example of the former is Alharaca, a group of feminist journalists from El Salvador working in exile and experimenting with getting offline and slowing down rather than giving in to the tech-driven pressure to speed up. They are bringing audience members together in person and trying out new storytelling approaches, such as board games and immersive sound installations. When it comes to civil society, activists in Hong Kong are adapting to pervasive AI-driven surveillance by using humor, embedding meaning in seemingly innocuous terminology and working through short-lived, temporary organizations.

Of course, co-opting technology, countering it, and innovating in the face of it are not mutually exclusive. Fogo Cruzado’s co-optation of the research possibilities AI offers is, of course, hugely innovative. It is only through narrative and organizational innovation that activists in places like Hong Kong and Tunisia are able to counter and resist state repression. Nevertheless, they are also distinct approaches, and we believe this trio of tactics serves as a potentially useful menu for organizations to consider as they navigate our current moment.

From the hyperlocal to the transnational

Several of the case studies foreground a turn to the hyperlocal as a way to prioritize grassroots issues and voices sidelined by national media and politics, as well as to sidestep the scrutiny of authorities mostly focused on the national stage. Shifting the frame from one that places national politics in the center, what was previously thought of as marginal becomes central: hyperlocal stories, news and politics are where it’s at. This is where politics intersects with people’s lives, where connection and power-building can happen outside of surveilled tech platforms, where issues intersect, where audiences and media creators overlap, and where change seems possible.

At the same time, there is a turn to the supra-national, looking at trends and connecting the dots of political developments beyond the nation-state, and as a way of sharing lessons and building cross-border solidarity. Just as authoritarians connect and learn from one another across borders, just as technology knows no borders, so civil society actors realize they need to connect across boundaries and borders to make meaning and build power.

Flexibility is everything

In a fast-changing environment, where techno-authoritarianism is both continually innovating and intentionally disrupting and overwhelming, being flexible and adaptable is an essential strategy. While this is apparent across all of the case studies, perhaps the clearest example comes from Hong Kong, where the case study authors highlight the importance of ephemeral infrastructures that can appear, dissolve and reappear or reconfigure themselves as needed. These arrangements — micro-groups, informal collectives, rotating convenors, volunteer networks — sustain momentum while avoiding singular points of vulnerability. This is also a really important lesson for funders to note – both resilience and impact depend on the ability to anticipate and pivot at short notice, and funding arrangements need to build this in.

It takes a constellation

No single organization can do everything; no one can achieve systemic impact acting alone. As our case studies illustrate, robust, decentralized and collaborative networks are necessary, both within countries and across borders. Narrative workers and civil society actors are actively forming alliances and seeking assistance and expertise from organizations and peers from beyond their fields to bolster their narrative efforts, strengthen their advocacy campaigns, and guard themselves against digital attacks and surveillance. Funding strategies in turn should proactively support what the Polis Project calls “the infrastructure of resistance.”

The interconnectedness of narrative, technology and power

Across the 10 case studies, we see three elements in constant interaction, each inseparable from the others: narrative, technology and politics. Civil society actors are narrative workers: narrative is upstream of technology, and culture and meaning-making constitute THE key terrain of struggle right now. They are technologists: operating with, on and through current and emergent technology to build power and engage in the struggle over culture, narrative and meaning, constantly adapting and innovating, always balancing technology’s possibilities and affordances with its risks, limitations and harms. They are political actors, organizers and power-builders: making meaning both about and with technology, in the interests of social justice and democracy.

Overall, while the surveillance, abuses, and huge concentrations and imbalances of power that AI and other new technologies enable are very worrying, we found a good deal of encouragement in these case studies. Operating in hostile territory, using tools owned by so-called “broligarchs” and authoritarians, social justice-focused advocates and activists, journalists and storytellers around the world are successfully adapting and employing technology and culture to build people power in the interests of democracy and social justice.

Brett Davidson is founder and principal at Wingseed LLC, and works with the International Resource for Impact and Storytelling (IRIS) as lead for narrative infrastructure building. Previously he was Director of Media and Narratives at the Open Society Public Health Program, and before that worked in civil society and a radio journalist in South Africa. He writes about narrative change and listening as a political act. 

Written by Guest Contributor

More and more restrictions are being imposed on the internet in Russia

Originally published on Global Voices

Vladimir Putin does not use or know how to use Internet. Screenshot of YouTube video from YouTube Channel. Fair use.

This post is part of Global Voices’ April 2026 Spotlight series, “Human perspectives on AI.” This series will offer insight into how AI is being used in global majority countries, how its use and implementation are affecting individual communities, what this AI experiment might mean for future generations, and more. You can support this coverage by donating here.

At the beginning of April 2026, the Russian government’s attempts to limit access to anything out of its control on the internet kicked into high gear. Apart from ongoing mobile internet shutdowns — including an unprecedented one in the capital that lasted for three weeks — there is now a war on VPNs, attempts to try out “white lists” on both mobile and home internet connections, and blockage of the last “Western” messenger, Telegram.

It might be a strange coincidence, but the Israeli–US war on Iran, “Operation Epic Fury,” which has employed a lot of AI warfare, started on February 28 — a week before the full mobile internet shutdown in Moscow. During the first few days of the war up to March 3, as many as 17 high-ranking Iranian government and military officials were killed in strategic targeted strikes involving AI warfare strategies.

According to the BBC, since February 28, the United States has launched more than 11,000 strikes against Iran, many reportedly identified by project Marvin AI. Maven Smart Systems is a project by the Palantir company, which has been developing AI-enabled solutions for the Pentagon since 2017. Maven uses machine learning algorithms to analyze and fuse vast amounts of surveillance data from multiple sources, made possible through data integration. Since 2025, it also integrates large language models (LLMs), such as Anthropic’s Claude, to enhance intelligence fusion, targeting, and accelerated decision-making. The data that the project uses to analyse and identify potential targets include photographs, satellite imagery, geolocation data (IP address, geotag, metadata, etc.) from communications intercepts, infrared sensors, synthetic-aperture radar, and more.

The use of AI warfare in Iran has been criticised by experts. In an interview with France 24, political theory professor Elke Schwarz described the radical acceleration of both the process of identifying military targets using artificial intelligence and the speed of decision-making regarding strikes, noting that in the first 24 hours of this war alone, the US launched a thousand missiles per day — about 41 missiles per hour — against specific targets. To Schwarz, this implies a virtual absence of human oversight over such decisions, as it is physically impossible to ensure such a level of control. The professor believes this is extremely dangerous, especially considering that AI models have a reliability of only 25–50 percent, meaning they are very often wrong. She added that legislators and international organizations need to intervene, to determine the permissibility and impermissibility of using such AI models in military operations.

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to describe the technical specifications of how AI warfare initiatives like Project Maven specifically identify human targets, it is possible that shutting down most of the mobile internet in Moscow from March 6–24 — as well as other measures to control the remaining pieces of the Russian internet — was triggered by its use, according to some Ukrainian sources.

TV Rain and other independent media claimed that Putin was very concerned about his safety after the US kidnapped Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro. Various media sources also claimed that Putin’s paranoia might have grown since the “cynical murder” — as Putin himself called it — of Khamenei and other high-ranking Iranian officials.

The only comment that journalists received about this unprecedented mobile internet shutdown in Moscow was from Putin’s press secretary Peskov, who kept saying that it was done in the name of “security.” Although mobile internet shutdowns have been going on in Russia for months now, they have never before been implemented at such a scale. It collapsed not only a large part of the digitally-based service sector in Moscow, but also the metro, grocery stores, and even public toilets. Independent Russian media outlet The Bell wrote that, according to their sources, the requirement to restrict internet access in certain districts of Moscow was given to operators by the Scientific and Technical Service (STS) of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s main security agency.

The shutdowns were “handed down from above,” a government official confirmed. According to the source, the government did not know the reasons, but the justification was countering threats, though the specific types of threats remain unknown. “A certain map was received from the STS of the FSB, marking where the internet needed to be switched off. At the same time, law enforcement officials strongly hinted that this was not their decision; it had also been passed down to them,” one of The Bell’s sources said.

Later on, the popular and the last remaining “Western” messenger, Telegram, was blocked, in spite of the fact that even those from the military fighting in Ukraine were actively against it. However, Telegram’s owner Pavel Durov said that, even after the block, nearly 65 million people from Russia still use Telegram every day.

After that, Roskomnadzor, the federal executive agency responsible for mass media, attempted to block VPN traffic, and half of Russia’s internet services stopped working, including banking apps and state services. Some IT specialists and media — even those loyal to the state, like Nataliya Kasperskaya — said that Roskomnadzor, “in the frenzy of fighting methods to bypass blocks, has taken down half of the Runet’s services.” She later had to delete her post and apologize.

Roskomnadzor and the Ministry of Digital Development then moved to make the remaining Russia-based platforms such as the search engine Yandex, social media VK, and online market Ozon block users who use their internet services while employing VPNs. According to some media sources, having been threatened with measures such as eliminating them from white lists and depriving them of licences to work; they were forced to sign an agreement to comply with those instructions. Despite the possibility that the blockage might damage their businesses and destroy any international strategies they might have, there is evidence that the companies have already started doing just that, despite the fact that most of them have owners and CEOs who are closely connected to the Kremlin. Some investigative journalists have even suggested that some of the remaining platforms bring income to Putin and his friends the Kovalchuk brothers.

The companies are now also obliged to spy on their users and pass on the data to the authorities. VPN detection is proposed in three stages: first, companies must determine a user’s IP address; next, they must search for signs of circumvention tools on the device through their own applications; and finally, they are required to check devices running operating systems beyond Android and iOS.

It is important to understand, writes The Bell, that this marks a shift from passive internet censorship to active enforcement. “In essence, every such application will become spyware,” explains one VPN developer. In other words, any app from a Russian online platform risks becoming similar to Max. Most likely, in the near future, applications linked to Russia will track VPN usage and forward their findings for blocking. This measure is highly effective and difficult to circumvent.”

Investigative journalist Andrei Zakharov explains in the Meduza podcast that Alexandra Prokopenko, author of a book about the Russian elites of Putin’s regime, recently wrote that Putin and other old people from the siloviki, are now the ones in control in the Kremlin. Zakharov emphasises that if this group decides there is a threat — imagined or not — they simply shut everything down, as they want to know exactly what Russians think, say, watch and do on the internet.

Additional proof that Putin and the siloviki are impressed by AI warfare, is that the Russian leader began to actively speak about AI. Putin spoke at a meeting about the importance of developing Russia’s own LLMs and introducing them in every institution, including the military.  This sits in stark contrast with the fact that there are constant internet shutdowns, and all access to foreign technological services is blocked. Moreover, because there is such a war on international traffic and VPNs, even access to open source tech innovations like GitHub or Hugging Face would be severely restricted.

It's worth noting that Russia has also been using AI technologies in its war on Ukraine, albeit via narrow, niche models with specific objectives. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, Russian developers are using open language models, such as Mistral, Qwen, LLaMA, and YOLO, to create programs for autonomous military platforms with AI elements. These include drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as guidance and interception systems. Thus, Russia is less dependent on sanctions — the models are openly available — and Russian developers don’t have to create them from scratch; instead, they can build military AI solutions using existing foreign open source development tools.

Before the Ukraine war, Russia had an AI development program through 2030, held hackathons, and created startups. Some experts even predicted that Russia, with its powerful mathematical training system and funding for AI development, could become a serious niche player in AI. Now, Putin is speaking of AI again, but with an emphasis on defence, warfare, and sovereignty. There is also the possibility that foreign AI solutions could be blocked in 2027 as part of this new strategy.

However, even pre-war AI developments in Russia had mixed consequences. This was highlighted by a recent scandal in which it was discovered — according to an investigation by Le Monde and Forbidden Stories — that Iran acquired Russian company NtechLab’s FindFace facial recognition system to combat protests.

The same facial recognition systems had already been in use in Russia before the war with Ukraine. In Moscow, they helped identify protesters, and during the war, they identified conscripts attempting to avoid being sent to the front. Although there is currently no full internet shutdown in Russia in contrast with Iran, and no domestic internet like in North Korea, the Russian version gets closer daily.

Written by Daria Dergacheva

Can the Indonesian government truly tame digital platforms?

Originally published on Global Voices

Four tween boys crowd around a mobile phone in Jakarta, Indonesia. Image from Flickr. License CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs, Meutya Hafid, along with several officials from government agencies, conducted an inspection of the technology company Meta’s office in South Jakarta in early March. The inspection aimed to compel the company to comply with Indonesian law. Meutya said:

Sore ini kita melakukan giat sidak di kantor Meta. Ini adalah tindak lanjut Pasal 40 Undang-Undang ITE yang menyatakan pemerintah bertugas melindungi keselamatan dan kepentingan umum dari berbagai gangguan akibat misinformasi dan disinformasi.

This afternoon, we conducted an inspection at Meta’s office. This is a follow-up to Article 40 of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE), which states that the government has the duty to protect public safety and the public interest from disruptions caused by misinformation and disinformation.

She explained that the inspection was conducted because Meta was considered not fully compliant with regulations in Indonesia, particularly regarding the spread of disinformation. During the inspection, the minister also asked Meta to be transparent about its algorithms and content moderation practices.

The inspection reflects the Indonesian government’s latest attempt to assert greater control over global digital platforms. Yet experiences in many countries show that the relationship between governments and digital platforms is never entirely one-directional. In Southeast Asia, efforts by states to “tame” platforms often turn into negotiations of power between governments, global technology companies, and broader geopolitical pressures.

Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs of Indonesia, Meutya Hafid, discusses Indonesia’s plan to tighten control over social media companies to protect Indonesia’s youth. Screenshot from CNA YouTube. Fair use.

In Indonesia, debates around disinformation and content moderation rarely move beyond ambiguous phrases such as “attacking honor,” “violating propriety,” or “disturbing the public.” But whose honor is being attacked? What social values are being violated? And what kind of content is considered disturbing to the public?

Is content criticizing the rape cases during the May 1998 riots, or criticism of nickel mining in Raja Ampat, considered “disturbing the public”? In June 2025, several public accounts on platform X received official notifications stating that their posts were “violating the law” according to the Indonesian government. These posts contained criticism of the government. Watchdogs argue that the government, through the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi), requested that X take down critical posts from accounts such as @neohistoria_id and @perupadata.

“Regulating platforms is not a problem, but the rules must be clear. Harmful content for whom?” said Masgustian from the Center for Digital Society (CFDS) at Universitas Gadjah Mada.

He argues that platforms are generally willing to cooperate with governments on content moderation. However, the main issue lies in the lack of clarity in regulatory definitions. In ongoing research conducted by CFDS, discussions with government representatives show that even within government institutions, there are different definitions of terms such as “terrorism” or “harmful content.”

For example, there is still no shared understanding between the definitions used by Komdigi and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN). According to Masgustian, this lack of clarity may create new problems in the implementation of content moderation.

Government efforts to regulate platforms

Government efforts to regulate platforms have intensified since technology companies were required to register as Electronic System Operators (PSE) in 2020. PSEs that fail to register may face administrative sanctions ranging from warnings and fines to access blocking by internet service providers (ISPs). According to the government, the policy aims to prevent the spread of harmful content and ensure personal data protection.

Within this regulatory framework, the government has greater room to influence platform policies. For example, TikTok temporarily suspended its “live” feature during a national demonstration in September 2025. TikTok stated that the suspension was voluntary after being summoned by Komdigi, while the government denied issuing any direct order.

Komdigi also operates a system called SAMAN. This system allows the ministry to compel social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok, and YouTube to remove content within 4–24 hours based on government orders. If platforms fail to comply, they may be issued fines of up to Indonesian Rupiah 500 million (over USD 29,000) per piece of content, or be blocked altogether.

According to Alia Yofira, a researcher at Purplecode who focuses on technology and human rights, platforms must not only comply with takedown requests but also fulfill mandatory registration requirements. If they fail to comply, they risk being blocked.

“The consequence was faced by Wikimedia, their system was blocked because they refused to register,” Alia explained in an interview with Global Voices. “Blocking websites, however, can also be considered a human rights violation because it disrupts public access to information and administrative services.”

Members of Wikimedia Indonesia meet up for a workshop. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 4.0.

Alia further explained that the concern is not only about website blocking but also about access to personal data. She described how Komdigi held private meetings with digital platforms following large-scale demonstrations in August 2025. After those meetings, platforms disabled the “live” feature, particularly on TikTok and Instagram, although Instagram limited the restriction to users with fewer followers.

“During protests, demonstrators not only documented police brutality, but also shared information about routes in and out of protest locations, closed roads, and access to first aid,” Alia said. “But at that time, Komdigi instead asked platforms to provide data on users who were livestreaming if those users monetized their livestreams.” According to Alia, this suggests that the government’s intervention is not only about regulating disturbing content but may also limit public access to information.

From media control to platform governance

Government attempts to regulate digital platforms are not entirely new. As people increasingly access information through social media platforms, the state appears to be shifting its mechanisms of control toward these platforms. Previously, such control was directed primarily at traditional media.

This had been the case since before the Reformasi period (1998), when the media in Indonesia was tightly regulated and controlled by the state, reflecting an authoritarian media system rather than a free public sphere. Under the Suharto regime, press freedom was constrained through political licensing, bureaucratic oversight, and administrative pressure that limited journalistic autonomy and critical reporting. Scholars note that media licensing and permit systems restricted dissent and empowered the state to sanction outlets that challenged official narratives. Regulatory bodies such as the Press Council operated under the Department of Information, reinforcing government influence rather than protecting autonomy.

However, the dynamics of government control over the media changed over time, particularly as media ownership became increasingly dominated by conglomerates whose political interests shaped media coverage.

Work by researcher Merlyna Lim maps the relationship between media and politics after Reformasi. Her report, The League of Thirteen, documents how a relatively small number of conglomerates, thirteen key media groups, dominate the media landscape across television, print, radio, and online outlets. within Indonesia. Her work shows how this concentration extends economic and political power into the hands of a few powerbrokers.

Media power became particularly visible during the 2014 presidential election. Tapsell describes these media owners as part of a “media oligarchy” that embedded their influence during electoral cycles. For example, Metro TV, owned by Surya Paloh, chairman of the NasDem Party, gave extensive and favorable coverage to then-presidential candidate Joko Widodo (Jokowi, President 2014–2024) during the 2014 presidential election. The station was widely perceived as supportive of Jokowi. Meanwhile, TVOne, owned by Aburizal Bakrie, former chairman of the Golkar Party, was more sympathetic to Prabowo during the same contest.

Government-platform relations in Southeast Asia

Similar tensions between governments and digital platforms can also be observed across Southeast Asia, a region characterized by fragile electoral democracies, hybrid regimes, and long histories of state repression, violence, and impunity. In this context, the relationship between governments and digital platforms is not always one-directional.

Two cases that illustrate these dynamics are Cambodia and Myanmar. In Cambodia in 2023, Prime Minister Hun Sen had a dispute with Meta. The case began when Hun Sen livestreamed on Facebook for more than an hour. During the speech, he threatened political opponents and said they could choose between “the legal system or a baton.” He also mentioned the possibility of sending “gangsters” to the homes of political opponents.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has been embroiled in numerous Meta-related controversies. Images from Pexels (free to use) and Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0).

The video was reported by many users because it contained threats of violence and intimidation ahead of the election. Initially, Meta did not remove the video because it was considered newsworthy. However, the decision drew criticism from human rights activists and democracy researchers.

The case was later reviewed by the Meta Oversight Board, an independent body that evaluates the company’s moderation decisions. In June 2023, the board ruled that the video violated Meta’s violence policies and recommended that Meta remove the video and suspend Hun Sen’s account for six months.

The Cambodian government reacted strongly. Hun Sen deleted his Facebook account and moved to Telegram and TikTok. The government also banned Oversight Board members from entering Cambodia and accused Meta of interfering in domestic affairs.

In the end, Meta removed the video but did not suspend Hun Sen’s account as recommended by the Oversight Board. Many analysts believe Meta sought to avoid escalating conflict with the Cambodian government. Facebook remains highly dominant in the country, while the government also retains the ability to restrict access to the platform. In such circumstances, both sides ultimately depend on one another.

A different dynamic can be seen in the violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar, often considered one of the largest moderation failures in Meta’s history.

According to a 2018 report by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, the Myanmar military and nationalist groups used Facebook to spread anti-Rohingya propaganda, misinformation about Muslims, and hate speech that incited violence. The report concluded that Facebook played a “significant role” in spreading hatred in Myanmar.

One of the main issues was the lack of Burmese-language moderation, combined with algorithms that tend to promote emotionally provocative content. Following international criticism, Meta acknowledged that it had responded too slowly.

In 2021, Rohingya communities filed lawsuits against Meta in the United States and the United Kingdom seeking damages of up to USD 150 billion. The lawsuits argue that Facebook’s algorithms amplified hate speech that contributed to violence against the Rohingya.

However, these cases face major legal barriers under U.S. law, particularly Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides internet platforms with legal immunity for content posted by users. To date, no court has ordered Meta to pay any damages for its moderation failures.

Nevertheless, legal pressure, reputational risks, and regulatory scrutiny pushed Meta to introduce reforms, including hiring more local-language moderators, dismantling Myanmar military propaganda networks, and banning Myanmar military accounts from Facebook and Instagram.

These cases show that platform decisions are often shaped by three main pressures: legal risk, regulatory risk, and reputational risk. For platforms, the decision to comply with local regulations is often determined by the balance of costs and benefits.

Can the Indonesian government truly tame digital platforms?

Answering this question involves more than examining domestic policy tools such as those historically used to control media before Reformasi. Unlike traditional media, which operate within national jurisdictions, digital platforms are global infrastructures that operate across borders.

As a result, attempts by governments to regulate or “tame” platforms are rarely purely coercive. Instead, they often become negotiations between state authority, the interests of global technology companies, and broader geopolitical dynamics within global internet governance.

The relationship between governments and digital platforms is therefore never simple. Governments can introduce regulations, summon platforms, or even threaten to block access. Yet digital platforms also possess enormous power through the technologies, algorithms, and global information infrastructure they control.

Written by Irma Garnesia

An analysis of Bangladesh’s first AI-saturated election, where seeing was no longer believing

Originally published on Global Voices

A roadside campaign stall covered with large candidate banners, party iconography (a rice-stalk motif), and rows of photocopied flyers. Used as a representative image illustrating how printed and synthetic visuals populate the civic landscape in the lead-up to the 2026 Bangladesh general election. Photo by the author. Used with permission.

This post is part of Global Voices’ April 2026 Spotlight series, “Human perspectives on AI.” This series will offer insight into how AI is being used in global majority countries, how its use and implementation are affecting individual communities, what this AI experiment might mean for future generations, and more.

A photograph began circulating across Bangladeshi social media on December 14, 2025, that would majorly influence the national election on February 12 — the first election since the July 2024 student-mass uprising toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government. The high-stakes vote was considered a penultimate test of whether Bangladesh could rebuild and realize its hopes for a free and fair democracy following the uprising.

The image showed Shadik Kayem, 27th Vice-President of Dhaka University Central Students’ Union, sitting across a small table from another man, apparently sharing tea in what looked like a casual meeting between acquaintances. The timing made the photograph explosive: just three days earlier, Osman Hadi, the coordinator of Inqilab Moncho (Revolution Platform), a cultural organization formed by people associated with the July 2024 student-mass uprising, had been shot in Dhaka, triggering immediate political controversy about who orchestrated the attack.

The man sitting with Kayem in the photograph was allegedly Hadi’s shooter.

However, all was not as it appeared. The fact-checking organization FactWatch determined that this photograph was fake and had been generated using artificial intelligence (AI).

Welcome to Bangladesh’s first AI-saturated election, where seeing was no longer believing.

The scale of synthetic reality

Between December 2025 and February 2026, as Bangladesh prepared for its national elections on February 12, a study identified 72 cases in which AI-manipulated content, specifically designed to manufacture false narratives and shape electoral outcomes, gained significant momentum online. This study reviewed fact-checks on AI-generated content targeting political parties, political figures, and the electoral process to understand how these false narratives were being leveraged.

Infographic by the author. Used with permission.

Nearly half of all AI-generated content involved claims of false activities and statements. Forty-nine percent of AI manipulations created entirely fictional realities about what political leaders were doing, saying, or experiencing during the campaign.

Twenty-eight percent of cases deployed AI to create false statement attributions — putting specific words into the mouths of political figures through AI-edited photocards mimicking trustworthy media outlets.

The dominant AI tactic involved generating synthetic images of political figures in false contexts. AI-generated photographs showed newly elected Prime Minister Tarique Rahman digging in a field with a spade alongside a constituent during supposed campaign activities. Synthetic images showed him shaking hands with children at events he never attended. Each manipulation created false impressions about his campaign, his priorities, and his public persona.

AI-generated images and videos also circulated showing his mother, Khaleda Zia (the former Prime Minister of Bangladesh from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006) walking, claiming the seventy-six-year-old BNP chairperson was moving freely despite known serious health conditions. Additional AI content about Khaleda Zia addressed strategic questions about her political capability, potentially affecting BNP’s electoral prospects.

Meanwhile, despite being banned from participating in the election, the previous ruling party, Awami League, remained a target for AI manipulation. Deepfake videos showed former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina making statements from her exile in India that she never actually made. Additional AI video manipulations attempted to create impressions that she maintained governmental authority despite her exile, serving narratives that the election lacked legitimacy without Awami League participation.

Perhaps most audacious, an AI-generated video appeared showing former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad endorsing Hasina as Bangladesh’s legitimate leader. The deepfake leveraged international authority to support the Awami League’s exile position. Mahathir never made such statements. The video was entirely synthetic.

Falsified photocards

Political actors exploited this fragmented media landscape by creating or editing photocards (graphic news cards) that appeared to originate from established outlets like Somoy TV, Channel i, Jugantor, or Kaler Kantho.

False quotes attributed to the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party candidate Syed Abdullah Muhammad Taher appeared in fabricated Somoy TV photocards. Channel i photocards surfaced with similarly altered quotes from the same Jamaat leader.

When voters saw inflammatory quotes appearing across several trusted media brands, the multi-source validation made the fabricated quotes more credible than isolated false claims.

Edited photocards supposedly from the news site Barta Bazar about the Jamaat in Mirpur propagated hyper-specific, false narratives targeting particular constituencies.

Fact checkers encountered twenty separate cases involving AI-edited fake quotes. When photocards showed National Citizen Party chairperson Nahid Islam making incendiary comments, the manipulation used media brand logos to add credibility to the fabrications.

Additional modified photocards targeting political personalities demonstrated the systematic nature of this strategy across several parties and candidates.

The Osman Hadi falsehood

Three days after Inqilab Mancha coordinator Osman Hadi was shot on December 11, political actors began weaponizing his tragedy. AI-generated images claimed to show Hadi opening his eyes in his hospital bed, manipulating the public’s desperate hope for his recovery. The fabricated photographs spread rapidly across social media, each share intensifying a manufactured moment that his family and doctors could only contradict with denials — denials that were never as compelling as emotional, visual “proof.”

The incident didn’t die down. As February’s election neared, altered photocards using Barta Bazar’s name emerged, falsely claiming that the Jamaat-e-Islami party had sponsored the attack. Opponents fabricated evidence of Jamaat’s involvement, potentially swaying uncertain voters. This exploitation continued months after the shooting.

A rise in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories that once circulated as whispered speculation gained sudden credibility when an onslaught of AI-manufactured proof emerged to support them. An image appeared, claiming to document a secret meeting in Delhi between Bangladeshi activist Pinaki Bhattacharya, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, and politician Krishna Nandi. The synthetic image transformed unproven theories about foreign interference into apparent visual documentation. No such meeting happened. The image was entirely artificial.

Meanwhile, AI-generated images claimed to show Awami League protest marches in Bhola, suggesting the banned party could still gather supporters despite legal prohibitions. Fabricated images of Jamaat assemblies served dual purposes — either demonstrating overwhelming popular support or raising alarms about dangerous Islamist mobilization, depending on which narrative benefited the circulator. Additional synthetic images depicting massive political support and gatherings were released to reinforce these narratives.

The war between parties

Examining who attacked whom reveals the election’s underlying dynamics. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) absorbed the heaviest assault, with forty-seven cases targeting the party that would ultimately secure a landslide victory. Opponents clearly identified BNP as the threat requiring maximum firepower.

Jamaat-e-Islami confronted thirteen separate AI attacks. Edited photocards spread fabricated quotes from Jamaat figures, often questioning the party’s Islamic credentials or exploiting religious themes. When hackers compromised a Jamaat leader’s account and attributed false comments to him, the attack merged traditional cybersecurity breaches with AI-amplified distribution.

The Awami League persisted relevant enough from exile to warrant six counter-campaigns. Deepfake videos featuring Sheikh Hasina and fabricated photocards sought to challenge whatever legitimacy claims the banned party maintained.

The National Citizen Party’s youth leadership was targeted through multiple edited photocards that falsely attributed statements to convener Nahid Islam. Opponents sought to influence younger voters who’d participated in the July Uprising by releasing heavily edited images with inflammatory language, attributing them to Nahid Islam, attempting to alienate the very constituency that elevated NCP into relevance.

Another AI-generated video circulated, claiming to show police releasing election survey results, fabricating official statements about electoral prospects. The manipulation attempted to shape voter expectations. Edited photocards showed fabricated interactions between political figures, creating entirely fictional political relationships designed to confuse voters about actual coalition dynamics. AI-generated videos even purported to show Tarique Rahman asking for money during campaigning, suggesting vote-buying or financial corruption. The volume alone overwhelmed fact-checking capacity.

Blueprint for regional democracy

What happened in Bangladesh’s 2026 election represents something categorically different, wherein AI overhauled the political battlefield.

Bangladesh’s experience provides the first comprehensive documentation of AI weaponization in South Asian electoral democracy. India faces elections regularly. Pakistan’s political landscape remains volatile. Nepal and Sri Lanka conduct their own democratic processes. All now face the prospect of similar AI-driven misinformation campaigns.

The patterns documented here: temporal escalation toward election day, deployment of synthetic images and edited photocards, exploitation of sensitive political events, all represent tactical knowledge that political operatives throughout the region are certainly studying.

Written by Zulker Naeen

Living between war and authoritarian control produces a particular psychological condition

Originally published on Global Voices

US-Israeli bombing of Tehran on March 3, 2026. Photo by Avash Media on Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0).

By Bahareh Sahebi

In Iran today, while Israeli and U.S.  missiles and airstrikes hit the country, daily life unfolds under a visible security presence. Since the protests that erupted last December 28, human rights groups have reported an increase in armed patrols and checkpoints along major roads and city intersections. 

Soldiers and members of the Basij militia stand with military rifles, stopping cars, questioning pedestrians, and in some cases asking people to unlock their phones so messages, photos, and social media accounts can be inspected.

Many Iranians today live between two converging fires: From above comes the threat of indiscriminate bombs and missiles from the escalating war waged by Israel and the United States; from below, the constant pressure of a state that continues to arrest, execute, and tighten its control over the population.

What often disappears in geopolitical debates is the psychological environment created by these conditions. When civilians live under both war and authoritarian rule, behavior reorganizes around survival. People learn to calculate risk constantly. They consider what to say, where to go, whom to trust, and when to remain silent. What appears from the outside as passivity may instead be the quiet logic of living under conditions where a single message, conversation, or association can carry life-altering consequences.

Under such conditions, silence can spread through society in ways outsiders often misunderstand. When expressing dissent may bring punishment or isolation, many people remain quiet even when they privately disagree. Over time, this creates the appearance of public consensus where none actually exists.

Statements broadcast on state television by Iran’s judiciary chief warned: “Those who say or do anything in line with the will of America and the Zionist regime are on the enemy’s side and must be dealt with on revolutionary, Islamic principles and in accordance with the time of war.” Further warnings have been directed at the diaspora, suggesting Iranians abroad who “sympathise, support, or cooperate” with the US-Israeli war on the country could face seizure of property inside Iran and legal consequences if they return.

The lives behind geopolitics

Much of the international conversation about Iran focuses on geopolitics and regional power struggles. Inside the country, however, daily life is shaped by something far more immediate. People must navigate war and repression while living in a strained economy and facing growing difficulty obtaining basic necessities.

Moments like this are not only geopolitical crises. They are psychological ones. The decisions made by governments and militaries reshape the environment in which millions of ordinary people must think, speak, and survive, while their fate is being shaped by decisions far outside their control

Over time, environments like this reshape behavior. People learn to scan their surroundings for risk, avoid conversations that might attract attention, and measure their words carefully. Sociologists describe this as adaptive survival behavior. Individuals adjust their actions not because they agree with power but because the cost of defiance becomes too dangerous.

Despite the state’s efforts to project domestic unity during the ongoing war, large segments of the population continue to reject the Islamic Republic. Yet in a country where dissent can carry the risk of imprisonment or execution, silence cannot be mistaken for consent. Compounded fear by repression and war suppresses public expression.

Between two dangers

In most wars, civilians fear the battlefield. Under authoritarian rule, they fear their own government. In Iran today, both dangers exist at once.

The Iranian state has provided virtually no meaningful protection for civilians during the conflict. There are no widespread public shelters, no functioning national system of bomb shelters, and in many areas, no warning sirens to alert people when missiles are approaching. For many residents, the first indication of an incoming strike is seeing or hearing the explosion itself.

In some cities, residents describe gathering on rooftops at night to watch missiles cross the sky, believing open air may offer a greater chance of survival than being trapped inside collapsing buildings. These are the kinds of calculations civilians are forced to make when the U.S. and Israeli bombing is indiscriminate, and the state offers no protection.

The country is also still absorbing the shock of the killings that took place during the January and February protests, when security forces opened fire on demonstrators across multiple cities. Families are still mourning. Communities are still processing the violence. In that atmosphere, fear and grief shape how people respond to the new dangers of war.

For many Iranians, the bombs falling today may eventually stop. Wars end. Airstrikes cease. But the threat posed by the Islamic Republic has persisted for nearly half a century. The state has repeatedly responded to crises with arrests, executions, and intensified control. For those living inside the country, this history shapes how the present moment is experienced.

Outside the country, their silence is often misunderstood. Across global media and online commentary, the absence of visible opposition protests in Iran during wartime, while government-organized rallies are amplified by the state’s total control over domestic broadcasting, has been interpreted by some as evidence that Iranians are not seeking political change and are rallying behind the government in the face of an external enemy. 

But public silence rarely signals agreement. When expressing dissent carries the risk of imprisonment, violence, or death, people often conceal their views in public while holding very different beliefs in private, especially in times of war. Political scientists describe this dynamic as preference falsification.

Danger and uncertainty

Since the beginning of the war, the government has repeatedly imposed communication blackouts and severe internet restrictions. Many people have little access to information beyond what is happening in their immediate neighborhoods. In this environment, even basic awareness becomes fragmented. Much of the information leaving Iran now travels in small pieces: a short video, a voice message sent quietly through a trusted contact, a brief text confirming that someone is safe.

The information environment surrounding the conflict has fractured. Public conversation has hardened into competing narrative camps shaped by different assumptions and loyalties. Commentators often interpret events through ideological frames, highlighting facts that reinforce their position while overlooking those that complicate it.

Complex events are reduced to simplified stories designed to mobilize audiences rather than inform them. In this process, the suffering of civilians can become secondary to the narratives built around it.

Debates unfolding abroad can feel distant from daily life. Inside Iran, people navigate blackouts, militarized streets, economic strain, and the constant uncertainty of what the next day might bring. Families worry about relatives in different cities they cannot reach. Messages fail to deliver. Rumors travel faster than reliable information.

Behind these debates are the lives of ordinary people, rarely visible in geopolitical discussions. A child in Bushehr going to school carries the quiet anxiety that her classroom could become the target of an Israeli or U.S. missile strike. A mother in Tehran moves from pharmacy to pharmacy searching for chemotherapy medication that once kept her child alive but has now become impossible to find or afford.

For many families, these are not abstract policy debates. They are the realities shaping each day.

The people living inside Iran today are not characters in a geopolitical argument. They are human beings navigating extraordinary danger and uncertainty.

For Iranians today, life is lived in exactly this psychological space.

Written by Guest Contributor

She faced harassment even after her release from prison

Originally published on Global Voices

Hue Nhu at the Geneva Summit on Human Rights and Democracy. Photo from X post of Viet Tan. Used with permission

Vietnamese anti-corruption activist and former political prisoner Dang Thi Hue, nicknamed Hue Nhu, spoke about human rights and the state of freedom in her home country at the Geneva Summit on Human Rights and Democracy on February 18th.

The Geneva Summit is an annual event organized by around 25 organizations on the eve of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s main annual session.

Hue Nhu’s participation in the summit was a big win not just for the campaign promoting human rights in Vietnam but also for her, who endured years of persecution for her commitment to upholding social justice.

Hue Nhu was a public school teacher for 16 years. In 2018, she joined a nationwide movement criticizing corruption-tainted toll projects. Her offline and online advocacy earned the ire of authorities and private companies behind these controversial projects, which led to her incarceration from 2019 to 2023. She continued her activism after her release from prison. She was abducted in May 2024 but found a way to escape to Thailand. Since June 2025, she has lived in Germany as a political refugee.

During her speech at the Geneva Summit, she shared her reason for speaking out even in exile:

I’m telling my own story, a victim of dictatorship, and my wish is not to be silenced. Because when someone is forced into exile simply for speaking out, it's not just a failure of a nation, but a test of the conscience of the international community.

She narrated the harassment she faced when she started criticizing abuse of power in 2018 and 2019.

My frequent critique and demands for transparency have become a crime. I am being monitored. I am being summoned for questioning. I am being interrogated constantly.

She said that her right to due process was violated during the trial that led to her sentencing.

During the trial, four lawyers defended me, but the court did not allow me or my lawyers to speak. The trial was open to the public, but hundreds of police officers were deployed to prevent my family, friends, and supporters from attending. They jammed the cell phone signals throughout the entire courtroom area. The court imposed a sentence that was unconstitutional, a sentence that not only deprived me of my personal freedom, but also sent a broader message: Citizens are forbidden from speaking out.

She recalled that after her release from prison, authorities targeted not just her but also her friends and fellow activists. “Security forces throughout Vietnam have been relentlessly pursuing me,” she said. “My friends who spoke out with me have also been implicated. The most severely affected was detained for three days and beaten with electric batons until he fainted.”

Hue Nhu: a teacher targeted for demanding accountability. pic.twitter.com/cqsXHAmZKs

— The Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy (@GenevaSummit) February 18, 2026

In an email interview with Global Voices, Hue Nhu reflected on her journey from Vietnam to Geneva: “My journey in the struggle for democracy and human rights is not just the story of an individual, but a reminder that freedom and human dignity are always worth protecting.”

Looking back on her own experience, she gave this piece of advice to fellow human rights advocates.

If you dare to fight for others, millions of others will come to stand with you

Even in the most critical moments, I did not stop my activities, even expanding my reach and strengthening my online presence, regardless of the danger, seeking connections and readily contacting human rights organizations to have my voice heard.

Hue Nhu at the Geneva Summit on Human Rights and Democracy. Photo from X post of Viet Tan. Used with permission

Hue Nhu’s activism and the state-backed intimidation she faced drew global attention in recent years. PEN America issued a statement in 2024 expressing solidarity with Hue Nhu.

The persecution of Dang Thi Hue is a stark reminder of the risks faced by those in Vietnam who dare to speak out and challenge the government’s authoritarian rule. No one should be subjected to threats or reprisals for expressing their views, online or offline.

In an email interview, Michel Tran Duc, advocacy director of human rights group Viet Tan, highlighted the significance of Hue Nhu’s presence at the Geneva Summit.

Outside of Vietnam, the human rights violations perpetrated by the Vietnamese authorities are largely unknown to the general public. For the vast majority of people, Vietnam is a popular tourist destination, or even a place to do business. It is therefore crucial to shine a light on the victims of the regime and to hold those responsible accountable. The Geneva Summit on Human Rights and Democracy is an invaluable platform to give victims a voice, to share their stories, to acknowledge their suffering, and to ensure they receive the support they deserve.

Despite living in exile, Hue Nhu remains at risk due to the incidents of transnational repression allegedly perpetrated by Vietnamese state forces.

Here’s a video of Hue Nhu’s speech at the Geneva Summit.

Written by Mong Palatino

A colonial-era law was used to deter and arrest ‘Aurat March’ demonstrators in Pakistan

Originally published on Global Voices

Participants of Aurat March arrive to prepare for the march. Image by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

This year, on March 8, International Women’s Day, participants of the Islamabad chapter of the Aurat March (Women’s March) faced extreme brutality and arrests by the authorities after attempting to hold their annual rally in Pakistan’s capital. Organizers from the feminist collective Hum Aurtein say police used force to disperse the gathering and arrested more than 35 women, including several well-known activists. Authorities accused the group of violating Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a legal provision that bans public assemblies in designated areas. The detainees were released later that evening after nearly 10 hours in custody.

For the past eight years, Aurat March organizers have marked International Women’s Day (March 8) with creative demonstrations to raise awareness against patriarchy and advocate for the rights of women and marginalized communities in Pakistan. Over the years, marches have been typically organized in several major cities, including    Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Multan, where the four chapters are based. While the rallies have often faced pushback from authorities and conservative religious groups, organizers say this year’s detentions in Islamabad marked an unusually severe response.

On the morning of March 8, Aurat March organizers and participants gathered at a supermarket in Sector F-6, intending to march toward the Islamabad Press Club located downtown. Before the rally could begin, police detained the group and transported them in prison vans. Their mobile phones were confiscated, and they were taken to the Women’s Police Station in G-7. Witnesses said that friends and family members who arrived at the station seeking information about the detainees were also threatened with arrest.

Global Voices reporter at the scene observed police officers baton-charging people gathered outside the G-7 Women’s Police Station. Anyone standing near the station risked being detained. The area had been placed under heavy security, with a large police presence surrounding the building. And when members of the Global Voices reporting team attempted to document the situation, officers warned that they could also be arrested if they did not leave. Several individuals who tried to approach or enter the station were taken into custody.

According to a list issued by security authorities, a copy of which was obtained by Global Voices, at least 27 men and 34 women were taken into custody.

Women participants are being loaded into a van by the police. Image by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

Section 144 imposed in Islamabad

Police said the participants were detained for violating Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a legal order that restricts public gatherings and had been in place in Islamabad since the previous week. Authorities imposed the measure after protests erupted following reports that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been killed in strikes reportedly carried out by Israel and the United States.

Police also circulated a document stating that Aurat March organizers had been informed in advance about the Section 144 restrictions. However, participants disputed this claim, saying they had not received any such notice. Journalist Azaz Syed shared the document on X (formerly Twitter):

اسلام آباد پولیس نے کل محترمہ فرزانہ باری کو شہر میں دفعہ 144 کے بارے میں خط لکھ کر بتا دیا تھا ۔ بہرحال اگر انہیں اطلاع دی گئی تھی تو پولیس نے اپنا کام کیا ۔ مگر کیا ایک متنازعہ کردار کے سامنے انتظامییہ اور پولیس افسران کی پیشگی پیشی اور انہیں یقین دہانیاں ایک مناسب عمل ہے ؟ pic.twitter.com/Qfzn4X1aeO

— Azaz Syed (@AzazSyed) March 8, 2026

The Global Voices team spoke to several people who had been detained outside the G-7 Women’s Police Station. Many said they had been held together in cramped conditions in a single cell. Mavra Bari, a sociologist and activist, said nearly 80 women and children were confined in a small cell with a nonfunctional washroom and little space to sit. She noted that girls as young as 14 were among the detainees and that they were not allowed to contact their families. Bari said she had gone to the station only to check on her mother and sister, not as a march participant, and alleged that police violently snatched phones, pushed and shoved people, and even pulled some women’s hair and clothing. Male allies who accompanied them were beaten with batons, with one suffering fractures.

According to Bari, the arrests of about 34 women and 34 men took place despite no violation of Section 144, as many were simply outside the station inquiring about detained organizers. “The treatment was inhumane,” she said, adding that many detainees were released only after signing undertakings related to Section 144. She emphasized that Aurat March is intended as a “creative celebration of International Women’s Day,” designed to highlight issues such as gender-based violence and the persecution of activists. “The arrests stood in stark contrast to official messages celebrating women’s rights on the same day,” she said.

One woman, who requested anonymity, told Global Voices that detainees were pressured to sign an affidavit containing threatening language. According to her, the document stated that they had caused a “disturbance to the police” and committed various legal violations, and included a clause requiring them to pledge that they would not participate in similar events again.

Police arresting an individual. Image by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

Even journalists were not spared. Those who went to cover the incident and speak with the families of the participants were reportedly detained and manhandled.

Condemnations

Freedom Network, an organization that monitors press freedom violations, issued a statement condemning the crackdown on both the Aurat March participants and the journalists.

Aurat March organizers, alongside the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, held a press conference at the Islamabad Press Club to protest the police’s handling of the march. They spoke out against the manhandling, threats, and the pressure to sign what they described as unreasonable affidavits. The organizers demanded an investigation into the incident and called for accountability for those responsible.

During the conference, they acknowledged that Section 144 had been in effect in the federal capital but emphasized that civil society does not accept laws that violate citizens’ fundamental rights. They also said that authorities had warned of a potential suicide bomber threat. Meanwhile, friends and family members who went to the police stations to check on the detainees were reportedly detained themselves and faced threats.

Human rights activists criticized the government’s response. Nishat Maryam told Global Voices that state pressure around the march has intensified over the years, but this year’s crackdown was unprecedented. She added that it reflected the state’s priorities: “Rapists roam freely, yet the state targets unarmed, peaceful protesters. As a woman, I condemn this behavior — it generates deep anger and frustration,” she said.

Syeda Kashamala, a lawyer detained while checking on colleagues, questioned the legality of the arrests. “Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, while Article 19 protects freedom of expression,” she said, noting that Section 144, a colonial-era provision historically used to curb dissent, restricts public gatherings. “It is troubling that such a law is still used in a constitutional democracy where assembly is a fundamental right,” Kashamala added. Articles 9 and 10 provide safeguards against arbitrary detention and protect the grounds of arrest.

Police initially sought to apply Sections 188 and 352 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which relate to disobedience of orders issued by public servants and interference with government operations. However, after several hours of negotiations between authorities, senior activists, and political representatives, those detained were released after signing a written undertaking.

People gathered outside the Police station waiting for the release of the detained Aurat March participants. Image by Ramna Saeed. Used with permission.

The incident was raised in Pakistan’s parliament the following day. Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry defended the arrests, accusing the march participants of deliberately attempting to create a law-and-order situation. Meanwhile, lawmakers Shazia Marri and Nafeesa Shah of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) from the ruling coalition criticized the police response and condemned the treatment of the activists. Journalist Ali Hamza reported this on X:

PPP lawmakers took on the government in the National Assembly over the detention of Aurat March activists in Islamabad on March 8, questioning police action against protesters on International Women’s Day.@NuktaPakistan pic.twitter.com/rtu0Nde8Cb

— Ali Hamza (@alihamzaisb) March 9, 2026

The ongoing challenges for Aurat March

The march has consistently faced resistance from authorities and religious groups in previous years, and this year, the Islamabad chapter experienced an unusually harsh response, creating uncertainty for the other planned Aurat March events for this year.

Like last year, the Aurat March is planned to be held on different dates across different cities. The march is scheduled to be held in Karachi on Mother’s Day on May 10.

However, the Lahore chapter announced on March 8 that it will not hold a march this year, due to the observance of the holy month of Ramadan (a holy month for Muslims).

Laiba Zainab, from the Aurat March Multan chapter, told Global Voices that the organizers are monitoring the ongoing Iran war situation and will announce the march date soon. The march is planned to be dedicated to human rights lawyer Imaan Mazari and Hadi Chatta, both of whom were sentenced to ten years in prison on charges of “cyber terrorism” and spreading “false information” for posts on the social media platform X, in which they expressed solidarity with Baloch and Pashtun activists and criticized the Pakistan military.

Written by Ramna Saeed, R Umaima Ahmed

A movie about the Nuremberg trials made the forbidden list even before the law was enacted

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot taken from the official trailer of the film “Nuremberg,” via the Sony Pictures Classics YouTube channel; fair use.

On March 1, 2026, a Russian law prohibiting the distribution and screening of movies that may be viewed as discrediting “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” came into effect. According to the new rules, the Ministry of Culture will have the authority to refuse distribution licenses to screen movies deemed contrary to these values or which “[promote] their rejection.” The law also applies to online streaming services and social media.

According to some Russian media, the law will apply to both foreign and domestic films. Many well-known Hollywood movies are considered to be at risk, including works by directors like David Fincher, Quentin Tarantino, and Martin Scorsese. Authorities will pay particular attention to movies that may be interpreted as promoting “non-traditional relationships” or “rejecting family values”.

In Russia, foreign streaming services have not worked since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, domestic streaming services remain popular, and illegal streaming of pirated material is also on the rise; Putin signed a law in June 2024 that eased punishment for copyright infringement.

Streaming services may well have to delete a lot of movies. As Radio Svoboda noted, “traditional values,” according to this law, include patriotism, civic-mindedness, service to the fatherland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, a strong family, productive labor, and the priority of the spiritual over the material.

It is not yet known which particular movies are being targeted, although the film distribution company World Pictures confirmed that 2025’s “Nuremberg,” which had been scheduled to premiere in Russia on March 19, 2026, will not be released in Russian cinemas, since the Ministry of Culture did not provide a distribution licence. Explaining its decision, the ministry referred to paragraph 19, subparagraph Z of the rules governing the issuance of distribution certificates, which mentions “other cases defined by federal laws.”

The historical drama by director James Vanderbilt tells the story of the criminal trials of Nazi Germany’s leaders following World War II. Based on the book “The Nazi and the Psychiatrist” by Jack El-Hai, the film’s plot follows psychiatrist Douglas Kelley, who must determine whether Hermann Göring and other associates of Hitler are fit to stand trial.

The Sundance Film Festival’s hit “Splitsville” was one of the first movies that was reportedly denied release in Russia under the new law, based on its alleged “discrediting of traditional spiritual and moral values.” The movie is a humorous reflection by director Michael Angelo Covino on open relationships after forty, the midlife crisis, and sexual experimentation. According to Film.ru, just a year ago, a film like this would likely have made it onto the list of Russian releases without any problems.

Russian audiences also missed the new movie by Iranian director Jafar Panahi, “It Was Just an Accident,” which won the Palme d’Or at the most recent Cannes Film Festival. Its official cinema release in Russia had been planned for October 2025.

“It Was Just an Accident” did not receive approval for several reasons — Ministry of Culture officials stated that the film “contains materials that violate Russian legislation,” including the promotion of violence, extremism, and non-traditional sexual relationships.

The story follows Vahid, a former political prisoner who gets an opportunity to take revenge on his abusers. One day, a family brings their car to the auto repair shop where he works, and Vahid clearly recognizes one of them. After devising a plan for revenge, he begins to doubt whether carrying it out is the right decision.

“Parents Are Here,” a documentary by film scholar, director, and founder of Seans magazine Lyubov Arkus, was also denied a Ministry of Culture distribution license in 2025. It is the first and only documentary film — publicly known, at least — to have been denied the license.

Arkus herself described the situation on social media: “This film of mine did NOT receive a distribution certificate. It was removed from festival programs where it had already been announced and even included in catalogs. That doesn’t upset me very much. The real horror is that I am not allowed to show it.”

“Parents Are Here” is a prequel to another documentary, “Anton’s Right Here” (2012), which told the story of a young man living with autism spectrum disorder. Arkus is the founder of Russia’s first support center for people with autism.

The Russian release of the romantic comedy “The Threesome,” starring Zoey Deutch, which had been scheduled to premiere in early September 2025, was also canceled. As was the case with “Splitsville,” the official reason for refusing to grant the license has not been announced. The film revolves around Connor (Jonah Hauer-King), who becomes relegated to the “friend zone” by Olivia (Zoey Deutch). Hoping to make her jealous, Connor decides to start courting their mutual acquaintance Jenny (played by Jenny Brooks). The love triangle unexpectedly results in two unplanned pregnancies.

According to Film.Ru, officials were not troubled as much by the idea of open relationships as they were by the chaotic lifestyle of the characters themselves, which can also fall under the definition of “non-traditional spiritual and moral values.”

Several other movies were banned even before the law was in place. The Ministry of Culture refused to issue distribution licenses to Armando Iannucci’s comedy “The Death of Stalin,” for instance, as well as “Love” by Gaspar Noé, films from Ilya Khrzhanovsky’s “DAU” project — allegedly because they contained “propaganda of pornography” — and Paul Verhoeven’s film “Benedetta.” “Fairytale” by Alexander Sokurov was banned on the same grounds as “Nuremberg,” with officials citing “other cases defined by federal laws.”

Written by Daria Dergacheva